

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13

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SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDE-00 /094 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2992

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0370

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: NEXT STEPS IN THE MBFR DATA DISCUSSION

1. SUMMARY: AS A RESULT OF THE EAST'S JUNE 8 MOVE THERE IS NOW INCREASED FOCUS BOTH IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES ON THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN TABLED FIGURES AND WESTERN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE DATA DISCUSSION HAS NOW REACHED A POINT WHERE NEW TACTICS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR USE BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONSIDERING THIS TOPIC. THE WEST HAS PROBED FULLY THE BASIS FOR THE DIVISION OF EASTERN FORCES BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS AND ALL OTHERS, AND LITTLE OF A USEFUL NATURE REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THIS AREA. THE WEST CAN NOW DRAW UP A FAIRLY DETAILED PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY BY NATIONAL TOTALS SEPARATELY FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND--FOR GROUND FORCES-- BY CATEGORY. USING THIS INFORMATION, THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD

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NOW BE TO DEVISE NEW TACTICS FOR THE DATA DISCUSSION WHICH WILL MAXIMIZE PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ITS FIGURES AND WESTERN FIGURES. WE BELIEVE THAT TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO USE WITH THE EAST, ON A SELECTIVE BASIS, CERTAIN WESTERN DATA ON EASTERN FORCES. THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS AN APPROACH FOR DOING SO IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE

SOURCES AND METHODS. END SUMMARY

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFILE OF DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER WAS A NECESSARY PROCESS LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE NEXT STEPS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. THIS PROCESS REQUIRED THE EAST TO GIVE US SOME FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE METHODS BY WHICH IT HAD CHOSEN TO ALLOCATE ITS FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO CATEGORIES. BUT IT DID NOT, OF ITSELF, CREATE ANY PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO ACCOUNT EITHER FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FIGURES IT HAD TABLED OR FOR THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN ITS FIGURES AND NATO'S FIGURES.

3. WE BELIEVE THE DATA DISCUSSION SHOULD NOW BEGIN TO USE THE PROFILE THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED MORE DIRECTLY TO PRESSURE THE EAST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT HAS NOT INCLUDED IN ITS FIGURES ALL THE PERSONNEL WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERS PROPERLY ACCOUNTED FOR UNDER THE TERM "ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL." TO DO THIS, WE NEED TO BEGIN TO FOCUS THE DATA DISCUSSION ON SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF FORCES IN EACH WARSAW PACT COUNTRY. WE ENVISION THE NEXT STEPS AS A PROCESS WHEREBY THE WEST SINGLES OUT THE CATEGORY OF PERSONNEL IN MAJOR FORMATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS AND DEMONSTRATES THE LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THE FIGURES THE EAST HAS TABLED FOR THIS CATEGORY. THE SPECIFICS OF DEMONSTRATION WOULD, OF COURSE, VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. WE WOULD USE CERTAIN ROUGH CALCULATIONS

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MADE THROUGH DRAWING SELECTIVELY ON WESTERN DATA ON PACT FORCES TO DEMONSTRATE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TABLED EASTERN FIGURES, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SHOW THAT THE FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE EAST ON MANPOWER IN MAJOR FORMATIONS IS INSUFFICIENT TO MAN ALL TYPES OF UNITS WHICH THE EAST HAS AGREED ARE INCLUDED UNDER THIS HEADING. AT THE SAME TIME, THIS APPROACH COULD BE SUFFICIENTLY GENERALIZED AS NOT TO DISCLOSE SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BEYOND THAT WHICH IS ALREADY LARGELY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

4. THE ADVANTAGE WE SEE TO THIS APPROACH IS THAT IT WOULD ENABLE THE WEST TO DIRECT THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. THAT IS, THE WEST WOULD BE FOCUSING IN ON THE SPECIFIC AREAS OF ITS CONCERN. IT WOULD BE PROVIDING SOME DEMONSTRATION OF THE REASONS FOR ITS CONCERNS, AND THE EAST WOULD BE CONSTRAINED TO RESPOND IN TERMS OF THE WESTERN CRITICISM.

5. AN APPROACH BASED ON DEMONSTRATING INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES IN EASTERN DATA COULD ALSO BE DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS WITH A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF WHY EASTERN FIGURES ARE NOT CREDIBLE WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN

BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE EAST, THUS INTENSIFYING THE PRESSURE  
ON THE EAST TO REVISE ITS FIGURES.

6. IN SUCH A FASHION, THE EAST MIGHT BE LED INTO A  
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF WHAT IT HAS INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED.  
THIS COULD IN TURN LEAD TO A DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITIONS PRO-  
BLEM AND ULTIMATELY PROVIDE AN OPENING BY WHICH THE EAST MAY  
BE BROUGHT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ITS DEFINITION OF ACTIVE DUTY  
MILITARY MANPOWER, AS REFLECTED IN THE FIGURE IT HAS TABLED,  
DIFFERS FROM THAT USED BY THE WEST.

7. NO TACTIC OF DATA DISCUSSION CAN OF ITSELF ELICIT  
THE RIGHT ANSWERS FROM THE EAST. NEVERTHELESS, THE SUGGESTED  
APPROACH OFFERS A MEANS OF STEPPING UP THE PRESSURE ON THE  
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CREDIBILITY OF EASTERN FIGURES THROUGH DEMONSTRATING INTERNAL  
INCONSISTENCIES.

8. IF THE WEST CHOOSES NOT TO ADOPT THIS APPROACH, IT  
WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR WESTERN NEGOTIATORS TO

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MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF THEIR CHALLENGE TO EASTERN TABLED FIGURES WITHOUT AT SOME POINT INDICATING TO THE EAST THE LOCATION AND EXTENT OF THE MAIN PARTS OF THE DISCREPANCY. TO DEVELOP SUCH INFORMATION WAS THE REASON GIVEN BY THE WEST FOR ASKING FOR EXCHANGE OF DISAGGREGATED FIGURES. EASTERN REPS HAVE SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED, AND RECENTLY HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED, THAT WESTERN REPS INDICATE THE SIZE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE EAST'S "OFFICIAL" DATA AND WESTERN ESTIMATES ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS. REFUSAL BY THE WEST TO DO SO COULD BE USED BY THE EAST AS A BASIS FOR CLAIMING THE WEST HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN ITS OWN FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES. THE SUGGESTED APPROACH WOULD ENABLE THE WEST TO RESPOND TO THIS EASTERN REQUEST IN A WAY CALCULATED TO GIVE THE WEST MORE CONTROL OF THE COURSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSION.

9. IN CONSIDERING THIS APPROACH, THREE RELATED MATTERS SHOULD BE NOTED. ONE IS THAT, IN DEALING WITH THE EAST IN THE WAY DISCUSSED ABOVE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO USE NATO DATA ON PACT FORCES THAT HAS BEEN RECATEGORIZED ALONG THE LINES  
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SUGGESTED IN MBFR VIENNA 333.

10. SECOND IS THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY IN DEALING WITH DATA. THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE IS THE DATA DISCUSSION IS TO KEEP THE EXAMINATION CONCENTRATED ON EASTERN FORCES. THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE IS DESIGNED, THROUGH SELECTIVE USE OF WESTERN DATA ON EASTERN FORCES, TO FORCE THE EAST TO MOVE IN DIRECTIONS THE WEST WANTS TO GO ON DATA AND TO RESPOND TO WESTERN REQUIREMENTS FOR CLARIFICATION. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE UNWORKABLE IF ITS USE WAS TIED TO A REQUIREMENT FOR THE EAST TO PRODUCE ITS RECIPROCAL DATA ON WESTERN FORCES, BECAUSE THE EAST WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY REFUSE TO GIVE THIS FURTHER DATA. EVEN IF THIS WERE NOT SO, REQUIRING THE EAST ON GROUNDS OF RECIPROCITY TO TABLE ITS DATA ON WESTERN FORCES COULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE THE EAST WOULD PROBABLY TABLE DATA ON INDIVIDUAL NATO FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY INFLATED FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES. IN ADDITION, THE WEST WILL HAVE MORE PROSPECT OF OBTAINING EASTERN DATA IN THE FUTURE IF IT ASKS FOR SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL ITEMS FOR WHICH A NEED HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, RATHER THAN ASKING FOR ACROSS-THE BOARD PRESENTATION OF SIMILAR DATA FOR ALL WARSAW PACT FORCES AND FOR NATO FORCES AS WELL. ANOTHER MERIT OF PROCEEDING ON A NON-RECIPROCAL BASIS COULD LIE IN THE POTENTIAL RESPONSE IT WOULD GIVE THE WEST TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS (AML). THE WEST COULD POINT OUT THAT IT HAD PROVIDED, WITHOUT REQUIRING RECIPROCITY, CERTAIN DATA THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED; THE EAST SHOULD DO THE SAME FOR AML.

11. THIRD, THERE IS THE ISSUE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ESTIMATES OF EASTERN MANPOWER AND NATO ESTIMATES (MCM-86-76). THESE DIFFERENCES EXIST BOTH IN THE OVERALL TOTALS AND IN TOTALS FOR INDIVIDUAL EASTERN COUNTRIES AND FOR CATEGORIES OF FORCES OF THOSE COUNTRIES. IN SOME CASES, THE DIFFERENCES

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FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR TYPES OF FORCES ARE PROPORTIONATELY GREATER THAN THE DIFFERENCES IN OVERALL FIGURES. FOR EXAMPLE, USING US DATA, THE DISCREPANCY IN SOVIET FIGURES FOR MANPOWER IN THE FIRST CATEGORY IS ABOUT 60,000, WHILE NATO FIGURES SHOW THE DISCREPANCY TO BE SOME 85,000--A DIFFERENCE OF OVER 40 PCT. TO DATE, WESTERN REFERENCES TO THE AMOUNT OF THE DISCREPANCY HAVE DEALT ONLY WITH THE AGGREGATE FIGURE FOR GROUND AND AIR, AND HAVE BEEN FRAMED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS--"MORE THAN 150,000". IN THIS CONTEXT, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND NATO FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER HAVE NOT CAUSED PROBLEMS, THE DIFFERENCE BEING ONLY A FEW PERCENT. IF THE WEST WANTED TO INDICATE TO THE EAST THE GENERAL MAGNITUDE OF THE DISCREPANCY IN FIGURES FOR SOVIET MANPOWER IN MAJOR FORMATIONS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND NATO FIGURES WOULD BE A MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. WHILE THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM THAT WOULD PREVENT THE ALLIES FROM GOING AHEAD WITH THE SUGGESTED APPROACH, THE APPROACH COULD BE APPLIED WITH GREATER FORCE IF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND NATO FIGURES HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. THE UPCOMING NATO CONFERENCE ON DATA ON WARSAW PACT FORCES AFFORDS THE ALLIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO ELIMINATE THESE DIFFERENCES TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT.

12. IN CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES TO THE APPROACH SUGGESTED ABOVE, THE FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF EASTERN DATA COMES TO MIND. ALTHOUGH THE WEST MAY WELL WANT TO RAISE FURTHER DATA DEMANDS ON THE EAST IN THE FUTURE, THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE PRACTICAL AT THE PRESENT POINT. FOR ONE THING, THE DATA DISCUSSION HAS NOT YET REACHED THE STAGE WHERE THE WEST HAS DEVELOPED A COGENT CASE FOR A PARTICULAR TYPE OF EASTERN DATA OR WHERE EAST WOULD FEEL UNDER MUCH CONSTRAINT TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE ADDITIONAL DISAGGREGATED DATA. FURTHERMORE, THE WEST COULD PROPOSE THIS ONLY IF IT WAS PREPARED ITTSELF TO DISAGGREGATE FURTHER. BUT IF IT DID SO, THIS WOULD BOTH TRIGGER THE RECIPROCITY ISSUE AND TEND TO TAKE THE FOCUS OFF THE PROBLEM AREA, WHICH IS THE EASTERN, NOT THE WESTERN, DATA.

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## Message Attributes

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